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MATHEWS V. LUCAS: THE COURT SUSTAINS
ILLEGITIMACY DISCRIMINATIONS IN THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
In Mathews v. Lucas,' the United States Supreme Court upheld
provisions of the Social Security Act which distinguish children on the
basis of the legitimacy of their births. 2 In a series of cases prior to
Lucas,3 the Court had, with only one exception, 4 consistently in-
validated state and federal legislative classifications based on illegiti-
1. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
2. See notes 6-9 and accompanying text infra.
At common law the illegitimate was filius nullius-no one's son. Originally, the
primary legal disability the illegitimate child encountered was an inability to inherit, but
in later years other distinctions between the legal rights of legitimates and illegitimates
developed. In the United States, progressive legislation has alleviated many of the
burdens, and a few states have in effect abolished the status of illegitimacy. Note,
Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV. 45, 75 (1959). In most states, illegitimates now stand
on a par with legitimates with respect to their mothers. However, with respect to their
fathers, distinctions which vary widely between and within states remain. H. KRAUSE,
ILLEGrrIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, 1-8 (1971).
The Supreme Court decisions herein discussed have had significant impact in certain
areas. Nevertheless, as Krause argues persuasively, comprehensive uniform legitimacy
legislation is required if all vestiges of discrimination are to be eliminated. Id.; Krause,
Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44
TEX. L. REV. 829 (1966).
Discriminatory provisions based on legitimacy do not affect only a small minority.
Krause reports that in the United States in 1967 one in twelve births was illegitimate, and
the rate of illegitimate births has been increasing rapidly. In some urban areas, as many
as 40 to 50 per cent of all births are illegitimate. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND
SOCIAL POLICY, 8 (1971).
See generally Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v.
Louisiana & Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(1969); Krause, Equal Protection of the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1966); Note,
The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REv. 337 (1962); Note,
Illegitimacy & Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479 (1974).
3. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Richardson v.
Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972), aff'gmem. 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972); Richardson v.
Davis, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972), aff'g mem. 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn. 1972); Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532
(1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
4. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). See notes 31-33 and accompanying text
infra.
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macy as violative of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause
or of the equal protection component of fifth amendment due process.5
However, in sustaining the scheme at issue in Lucas, the Court deter-
mined that under certain circumstances legislative distinctions be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate children are constitutionally permis-
sible.
The provisions of the Social Security Act examined in Lucas pro-
vide monthly benefits to surviving children of deceased insured wage
earners who are dependent on their parent at the time of death.' Under
the Act, a legitimate child is presumed dependent.7 Further, a child is
deemed to be legitimate and thereby presumed dependent if at least
one of the following requirements is met:8 (1) He is entitled to inherit
personal property from the parent under state intestacy law;9 (2) His
5. The equal protection clause found in the fourteenth amendment applies only to the
states and not to the federal government. The due process clause of the fifth amendment
does apply to the federal government. The Court has recognized that "the concepts of
equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness,
are not mutually exclusive. . . . [W]e do not imply that the two are always interchange-
able phrases. But . . . discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process." Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The Court has thus applied equal
protection analysis to federal as well as state legislative discriminations. See, e.g.,
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971).
6. Every child . . . of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance
benefits, or of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such
child-
(A) has filed application for child's insurance benefits,
(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had not
attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had not attained the age of
22,. . . and
(C) was dependent upon such individual-
(ii) if such individual has died, at the time of such death,
shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit. ...
42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1970).
7. A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting father or his
mother or adopting mother at the time specified in paragraph (1)(C) of this subsec-
tion unless, at such time, such individual was not living with or contributing to the
support of such child and-
(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual, or
(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual. For purposes of this
paragraph, a child deemed to be a child of a fully or currently insured individual
pursuant to section 416(h)(2)(B) or section 416(h)(3) of this title shall be deemed to
be the legitimate child of such individual.
42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970).
8. Id.
9. In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently
insured individual for purposes of this sub-chapter, the Secretary shall apply such
law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property
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mother and father went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a
marriage which was invalid only because of some minor legal defect; 0
(3) The insured parent had prior to his death (a) acknowledged the child
in writing, (b) been decreed by a court to be the parent of the child, or
(c) been ordered by a court to contribute to the child's support." If the
. . ., if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was
domiciled at the time of his death. . . . Applicants who according to such law
would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child
or parent shall be deemed such.
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1970).
The Secretary of H.E.W. disagreed with the Supreme Court's position, first stated in
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631 (1974), that children who can inherit by state
intestacy law are presumptively dependent under the statute. The Secretary argued
that § 402(d)(3), see note 7 supra, which deems certain children to be legitimate and
therefore dependent, applies only to children who meet the requirements of
§ 416(h)(2)(B) or § 416(h)(3). Thus, under the Secretary's interpretation, children who
meet only the provisions of § 416(h)(2)(A) (eligible to inherit under state intestacy law)
must also prove dependency by showing that they were living with or supported by the
deceased parent at the time of death. Brief for Appellee at 38 n. 14, Norton v. Mathews,
427 U.S. 524 (1976), citing Social Security Claims Manual §§ 2408, 2418, 2421 (March
1975); Social Security Ruling 61-48, 1960-1961 Cum. Bull. 31.
The Court, in Lucas, defended its interpretation of the statute. 427 U.S. at 514 n.17.
While the issue has no direct bearing on the decision in this case, as appellees were not in
that disputed class of illegitimates, it does affect the reasonableness of the statutory
scheme as a whole. See note 57 infra.
For discussions of the two alternative interpretations of this statutory provision, see
Norton v. Weinberger, 390 F. Supp. 1084, 1090-92 (majority opinion), 1093 n.1 (Winter,
J., dissenting) (D. Md. 1975).
10. If an applicant is a son or daughter of a fully or currently insured individual but
is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured individual under subpara-
graph (A), such applicant shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such
insured individual if such insured individual and the mother or father, as the case
may be, of such applicant went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purport-
ed marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment described in the last
sentence of paragraph (1)(b), would have been a valid marriage.
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B) (1970).
I1. An applicant who is the son or daughter of a fully or currently insured
individual, but who is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured
individual under paragraph (2) of this subsection, shall nevertheless be deemed to
be the child of such insured individual if:
(C) In the case of a deceased individual-
(i) such insured individual-
(I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or
daughter,
(II) had been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant, or
(III) had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the
applicant because the applicant was his son or daughter.
and such acknowledgement, court decree, or court order was made before the
death of such insured individual, or
(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the Secre-
tary to have been the father of the applicant, and such insured indi-
vidual was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant at
the time such insured individual died.
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3) (1970).
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child is unable to meet any of these statutory presumptions of depen-
dency, he bears the burden of proving that the deceased was his
parent, and was living with him or contributing to his support at the
time of his death.'2
The appellees in Lucas, illegitimate children of a deceased insured
wage earner, were unable to meet any of the statutory presumptions or
to prove dependency.' 3 They appealed the administrative decision
denying them benefits, arguing that when paternity is not at issue, it is
a denial of equal protection to require proof of dependency only of
children who do not meet any of the statutory presumptions. The heart
of the argument was the reasonableness of the presumptions. The
district court accepted the equal protection argument and ordered
payment of benefits, 14 whereupon the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare appealed. 15 The Supreme Court held that the classification
scheme does not violate the equal protection component of fifth
amendment due process because the classifications are reasonably
related to the likelihood of dependency on the insured parent at the
time of death. 1
6
Over the years the Supreme Court has developed a two-tiered ap-
proach in analyzing equal protection challenges to legislative classifi-
cations. 17 If the legislative classification involves a "suspect class,' ' 8
12. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii) (1970). See note 11 supra.
Note that under § 402(d)(3)(B), a legitimate child who has been legally adopted by
another individual is not presumed to be dependent upon his natural parent. See note 7
supra. Here, too, the child must prove dependency if claiming benefits from the account
of that parent. Similarly, 402(d)(4) provides that step-children must prove their depen-
dency on the step-parent. Thus the requirement for proving dependency does not apply
exclusively to illegitimate children, nor does it apply to all illegitimate children. The
overwhelming number of children affected by the provision, however, are illegitimate.
13. The Lucas children's parents lived together unmarried from 1948 to 1966. The
children were born to them in 1953 and 1960, respectively. In 1966 the parents separated,
and in 1968 the father died. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 497 (1976). Thus although
the children had lived with and had been supported by their father for most of their lives,
they failed to meet the requirements of the Act because they could not prove dependen-
cy at death.
14. Lucas v. Secretary, Dep't of H.E.W., 390 F. Supp. 1310 (D.R.I. 1975).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970) authorizes direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a
decision of any court of the United States which holds an act of Congress unconstitution-
al or when the United States, any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, in
his official capacity, is a party to the action.
16. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976).
17. For a thorough introduction to equal protection, see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 657-897 (9th ed. 1975).
18. The Court has described various indicia of suspectness: "[ain immutable charac-
teristic determined solely by the accident of birth. . . [which] bears no relation to ability
[Vol. 14:235
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or intrudes upon a "fundamental interest,"19 it is subject to strict
judicial scrutiny and will be invalidated unless narrowly tailored to
achieve a "compelling" governmental interest. 20 Other legislation is
subject to a much less demanding "rational basis" test, requiring only
that the legislative scheme bear some rational relationship to legitimate
government purposes. 21 The Court's equal protection decisions, how-
ever, do not all fit easily into one category or the other, and many
lower courts and commentators have suggested that in fact the Court
frequently has employed an unarticulated middle standard of review. 22
to perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,686(1973);
a class "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San An-
tonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
The Court has found race, national origin, and alienage to be suspect classes. See
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (race); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (race); Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin); Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race);
Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (national origin).
Although the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1971),
found that sex met the criteria of suspectness, sex has not yet been held suspect by a
majority of the Court, and recent cases dealing with sex discriminations do not rely on
suspectness. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
19. Fundamental interests include: voting and full access to the ballot, Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); equal access to the judicial process in
criminal cases, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956); right of free interstate movement, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
marriage and procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); free speech, Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); and perhaps privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
20. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 638 (1969).
21. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); Weber
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972). See also Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71,76 (1971), quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920). "A
classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.'"
(emphasis added).
22. See, e.g., Tanner v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 51, 54 n.2 (6th Cir. 1975); Lucas v.
Secretary, 390 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 n.5 (D.R.I. 1975); Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F.
Supp. 1117, 1122 (D. Md. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 902 (1974).
Certain members of the Supreme Court have acknowledged the Court's departure
from a rigid two-tier standard, notably Mr. Justice Marshall. San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White indicated his
agreement with Justice Marshall's "spectrum of standards" notion, in a concurring
opinion in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973).
For a comprehensive analysis of developments in the Court's approach to equal
protection problems, see Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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The judicial standard of review appropriate when illegitimacy clas-
sifications are at issue has never been clearly defined. Although the
Supreme Court has not declared illegitimacy to be a suspect class, in all
but one of the illegitimacy cases prior to Lucas,23 the Court employed a
standard of review stricter than minimum rationality.
Levy v. Louisiana24 and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability
Insurance Company, 5 both involving the Louisiana wrongful death
statute, 26 are the earliest Supreme Court decisions in which legislative
classifications based on illegitimacy were invalidated. Although in both
cases the Court articulated a rationality standard, 2' 7 the Levy opinion
implied that fundamental interests and stricter scrutiny might have
been involved. 28 Because it appeared that the legislative schemes in
Levy and Glona 29 would have survived the characteristically deferen-
tial rational basis test, several commentators suggested that the cases
indicated a more stringent standard of review, and predicted the de-
mise of virtually all legislative classifications based on illegitimacy. 30
Three years later this optimism was diminished when, in Labine v.
Vincent,31 the Court upheld classifications which discriminated against
illegitimates in state intestacy laws. The Court emphasized the broad
powers of the state to regulate property dispositions and to protect
23. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
24. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
25. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
26. See note 29 infra.
27. "[T]he test . . . is . . . whether the line drawn is a rational one." Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968); "rational basis," Glona v. American Guarantee &
Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968).
28. "[W]e have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights. . . and
have not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it had history
and tradition on its side. . . . The rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial
relationship between a child and his own mother." 391 U.S. at 71.
29. In Levy, the Court held that the Louisiana wrongful death statute, construed by
the Supreme Court of that state as granting a right of recovery for the death of a parent
only to legitimate children, constituted an invidious discrimination impermissible under
the fourteenth amendment. Glona was a companion case to Levy, in which the Court
invalidated the state's construction of the same statute to bar recovery to a parent for the
wrongful death of an illegitimate child.
30. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, 84 (1971); Gray & Rudov-
sky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American
Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1969).
31. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). The provisions under review in Labine provided that un-
legitimated illegitimate children could inherit by intestacy from their father only if he left
surviving him no other descendants, ascendants, collateral relations, or wife. Id. at 534.
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family life,3 2 and seemed to imply that not even a rational basis was
required to sustain state legislation in areas traditionally reserved to
the states.33
The fears Labine aroused as to the future success of equal protec-
tion challenges to illegitimacy discriminations were mitigated a year
later by the Court's decision in Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company.34 The Court in Weber did not overrule Labine,35 yet it
32. Id. at 538.
33. "Even if we were to apply the 'rational basis' test ... the statute clearly has a
rational basis . I.." "d  at 536 n.6. (emphasis added).
The Court distinguished Levy and Glona on grounds that in Labine the state had
created no "insurmountable barrier" to the illegitimate child, because the father could
have allowed the child to inherit by leaving a will or legitimating the child. Id. at 539.
The dissent in Labine specifically noted that there was no need to address the issue of
a suspect class, as the statute did not meet even the minimal requirements of the rational
basis test. Id. at 551 n.18 (Brennan, Douglas, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
In light of the cases which followed Labine, some lower courts suggested that Labine
was an aberration and questioned its continued vitality even on its particular facts. See,
e.g., Lucas v. Secretary, Dep't of H.E.W., 390 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 n.6 (D.R.I. 1975);
Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117, 1124 (D. Md. 1973), vacated and remanded,
418 U.S. 902 (1974).
In fact, in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), a decision subsequent to Lucas,
the Supreme Court all but overruled Labine. The Illinois Supreme Court had relied on
Labine in upholding a state statute which prevented illegitimate children from inheriting
by intestacy from their fathers. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, and in doing so
clearly rejected the rationale of Labine. In Trimble, the Court acknowledged that while
deference is due to states in certain areas "there is a point beyond which such deference
cannot justify discrimination." Id. at 767 n.12. The Court also repudiated the "insur-
mountable barrier" theory by which Labine had previously been distinguished, as an
"analytical anomaly." Id. at 773. Thus, while the Court did not explicitly overrule
Labine, it is clear that Trimble has left it with little, if any, value as precedent.
But see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), handed down with Trimble v. Gordon. In
Fiallo, the Court upheld provisions in the immigration laws which differentiate between
legitimate and illegitimate children and their fathers. The opinion is reminiscent of
Labine in its rationale that because immigration is a political matter wholly in the control
of Congress, extreme judicial deference to Congressional decisions is appropriate.
34. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). In Weber, the Court found unconstitutional a provision of
Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation law which, while allowing unacknowledged il-
legitimate children to receive benefits, relegated them to a less favored class whereby
they could receive only if the maximum allowable benefits were not exhausted by more
favorably classified dependents, including legitimate children.
35. Labine was distinguished on the grounds of the traditional broad state authority in
regulating property dispositions, and by the fact that there was an "insurmountable
barrier" to the child in Weber which was absent in Labine. The "insurmountable
barrier" was a Louisiana statute which prevented the parents in Weber from acknow-
ledging the child because the parents had not been legally free to marry each other at the
time of the child's conception. Id. at 171.
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clearly suggested that illegitimacy classifications were subject to a
standard of review stricter than mere rationality. 36 The Court for-
mulated a dual test: "What legitimate state interest does the classifica-
tion promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classifica-
tion endanger?" 37 This, the Rehnquist dissent argued,38 was a "hy-
brid" between the two standards traditionally employed in equal pro-
tection cases.
Finally, in Jimenez v. Weinberger,39 the Supreme Court specifically
36. The language of the Court implied that both fundamental interests and a suspect
class were involved.
This Court requires that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship
to a legitimate state purpose. . . .[B]ut when state statutory classifications ap-
proach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises stricter
scrutiny.
Id. at 172.
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation
of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemna-
tion on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities
on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child
is an ineffectual--as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent.
Id. at 175.
37. Id. at 173. In applying this standard, the Court conceded the importance of the
state's interest in promoting legitimate family relationships, but found that the challeng-
ed provisions did not promote that interest. "[It cannot] be thought here that persons will
shun illicit relations because the offspring may not one day reap the benefits of work-
men's compensation." Id. The Court thus concluded that the classification at issue was
"justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise." Id. at 176. This
conclusion would seem to suggest that, despite the Court's language indicating that a
"stricter scrutiny" was applicable to illegitimacy cases, such stricter scrutiny was not in
fact required to invalidate the Weber discrimination.
38. Id. at 181 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39. 417 U.S. 628 (1974). See notes 55-56 infra.
In the time between the Weber and Jimenez decisions, the Court decided four illegiti-
macy cases, invalidating the challenged provisions in each. The Court's opinions in
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) and in New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v.
Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) are brief and conclusory, with minimal analysis in equal
protection terms. But the results in the cases implied that the Court employed a standard
stricter than traditional rationality. In Gomez, the Court held that "once a State posits ajudicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural
fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential
right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother. For a State to
do so is 'illogical and unjust.' " 409 U.S. at 538. In Cahill, a state welfare program
limiting benefits to households in which the parents were married and had at least one
minor child in common was held to constitute a denial of equal protection to illegitimate
children. The Court stated that the Gomez rationale applied equally to support provided
by the government as to support provided by fathers.
Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn. 1972), and Griffin v. Richardson, 346
F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972), were affirmed together by the Court without opinion, 409
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stated that it did not reach the issue of whether illegitimacy is suspect
and thereby subject to strict scrutiny. However, the Court rejected the
argument that, in areas of social welfare, the deferent rational basis
test40 was necessarily controlling.41
In summary, the illegitimacy decisions prior to Lucas appeared to
apply a standard of review somewhere between traditional rationality
and strict scrutiny. In addition, because of the Labine decision, the
cases were difficult to reconcile. Thus, lower courts have had difficul-
ty in ascertaining the appropriate standard of review42 to be used in
U.S. 1069 (1972). Davis and Griffin invalidated the same Social Security provision, 42
U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970), which provided that if the maximum award available on a single
account was not sufficient to meet the claims of all entitled (the insured worker and/or all
his eligible dependents), the benefits of certain illegitimate children would be reduced
first and even eliminated before the benefits of any other eligible individuals would be
reduced. The Davis court based its decision on the rationale basis test. 342 F. Supp. at
591. In Griffin, the district court concluded that a review of prior Supreme Court cases
did not clarify the applicable standard of review, but that the provision was invalid
"whether the standard is that the scheme must be 'rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination,' or that it is a 'patently arbitrary classification utterly lacking in
rational justification,' or that there is no 'compelling state interest' to justify the classifi-
cation." 346 F. Supp. at 1233.
40. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imper-
fect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78. 'The problems of government are practical
ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations-ilogical, it
may be, and unscientific.' Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61,
69-70. 'A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reason-
ably may be conceived to justify it.' McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
Applying these standards, the Court in Dandridge upheld Maryland's AFDC program
which limited the monthly grant per family to a maximum of $250, regardless of the
family's size or estimated needs.
41. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 633-34 (1974). The Court distinguished
Dandridge on grounds that the deference of that decision was due to the finite resources
available to the state, whereas there was no such problem in Jimenez.
42. See, e.g., Lucas v. Secretary, Dep't of H.E.W., 390 F. Supp. 1310 (D.R.I. 1975),
rev'd sub nom. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Eskra v. Morton, 380 F. Supp.
205 (W.D. Wis. 1974), rev'd, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F.
Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
See also Tanner v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 51, 54 n.2 (6th Cir. 1975) ("more than a
rational basis and less than a compelling governmental interest"); Beaty v. Weinberger,
478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 901 (1974) (rational basis); Norton v.
Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (D. Md. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 902
(1974) (means "must bear a direct and primary correlation to an actual statutory goal or
purpose"); Miller v. Laird, 349 F. Supp. 1034, 1046 (D.D.C. 1972) ("stricter scrutiny");
Watts v. Veneman, 334 F. Supp. 482, 485 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 476
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determining whether specific legislative provisions constitute a denial
of equal protection to illegitimates.
Mathews v. Lucas did not wholly resolve these difficulties. The
opinion did, however, make explicit that illegitimacy is not entitled to
suspect status. 43 The Court found that while illegitimacy does bear
some of the indicia of suspectness, "discrimination against illegiti-
mates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the
historic legal and political discrimination against women and Neg-
roes."4 The Court held that illegitimacy classifications are, therefore,
not subject to "our most exacting scrutiny." ' 45 As the dissent made
clear, however, the majority still failed to define the appropriate level
of scrutiny. 46 The Court referred to "this realm of less than strictest
scrutiny," 47 and a scrutiny that is "not a toothless one," 48 but ultimate-
F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (classification sustained unless "patently arbitrary [and]
utterly lacking in rational justification").
The Kentucky Supreme Court was particularly cynical about the ambiguity of the
Court's standards in this area.
It is readily apparent that the meaning of the equal protection clause cannot be
ascertained from what it says, nor even from what the Supreme Court has said
about it. As in Regina v. Ojibway* [Reprinted by permission in Stevens v. City of
Louisville, 511 S.W.2d 228, 230-31 (Ky. App. 1974)] a pony was found to be a small
bird, so under the 14th Amendment an illegitimate child may be either a speckled
bird or a jackass, depending on its current aspect as (and when) viewed by the
keeper of the royal secrets of the Constitution. Indeed it appears that here is a
comer of the world Alice in Wonderland would not find unfamiliar.
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 531 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Ky. 1975).
43. As noted in Brief for Appellant at 40, Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976),
some of the justices had previously indicated a willingness to find illegitimacy classifica-
tions subject to strict scrutiny. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 61 (Stewart, J., concurring), 108-09 (Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (1973).
In addition, some lower courts had expressed their beliefs that illegitimacy classifica-
tions should be subject to strict scrutiny. Lucas v. Secretary, Dep't of H.E.W., 390 F.
Supp. 1310, 1317 (D.R.I. 1975); Eskra v. Morton, 380 F. Supp. 205, 215 (W.D. Wis.
1974), rev'd, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975).
44. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,506 (1976). It is curious that in this statement the
Court included women with Negroes, as race has clearly been found to be suspect, but
sex has not. See note 18 supra. Perhaps the Court, or at least Justice Blackmun, believes
sex bears the indicia of suspectness, but is reluctant to make such a determination as
long as ratification of the E.R.A. remains before the state legislatures. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1971) (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
45. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976).
It is important to note that while the dissent vigorously objected to the decision in this
case, it did not reply on a finding of suspectness or fundamental rights to support its
position. The dissent seemed to suggest a middle standard. "[T]he Court should be
especially vigilant in examining any classification which involves illegitimacy." Id. at
520. (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
46. Id. at 519.
47. Id. at 510.
48. Id.
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ly appeared to rely on the traditional rationality standard.49
The degree of scrutiny in fact applied in Lucas can be discerned in
the Court's analysis of the particular statutory scheme. The Court
reasoned that the statutory classifications were "obviously" created to
serve the legitimate government interest in administrative convenience
by minimizing the need for individual determinations of eligibility.50
Prior illegitimacy cases were distinguished in two ways. First, under
the provisions at issue in most of the earlier cases,5' "not only was the
legitimate child automatically entitled to benefits, but an illegitimate
child was denied benefits solely and finally on the basis of illegitimacy,
and regardless of any demonstration of dependency or any other
legitimate factor."52 Here, "by contrast, the statute does not broadly
discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates without more, but is
carefully tuned to alternative considerations. 5 3 Thus, in contrast to
plaintiffs in these earlier cases, the Lucas children were denied bene-
fits not because of their illegitimacy per se, but because they did not
meet the constitutionally permissible requirement of dependency. Sec-
ond, Jimenez54 was distinguished in that the children there had been
conclusively denied benefits, 55 whereas the children in Lucas had an
49. "We conclude that the statutory classifications are permissible, however, be-
cause they are reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death." Id. at 509.
"Our role is simply to determine whether Congress' assumptions are so inconsistent or
insubstantial as not to be reasonably supportive of its conclusions . Id. at 516.
50. Id. at 509.
The administrative convenience rationale necessarily assumes that the cost of paying
benefits to children who are not in fact dependent but who meet the statutory presump-
tions of dependency is less than the cost of making individual determinations of depen-
dency for all children. Given the large number of children who qualify for benefits under
the statutory presumptions without in fact meeting the dependency requirement, the
validity of this rationale is questionable. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 219-20
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). (similar argument made in refutation of administrative
convenience rationale in the context of social security widow's benefits).
51. 427 U.S. at 511. The Court here distinguished New Jersey Welfare Rights Organi-
zation v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Richardson v.
Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968).
52. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 511.
53. Id. at 513.
54. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
55. Jimenez was a challenge to 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(B)(ii) (1970), virtually identical
to § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii) involved in Lucas (see note 11 supra), but relating to dependents of
disabled insured wage earners rather than dependents of deceased insured wage earners.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A)(ii) (1970) there are virtually identical provisions applica-
ble to children of insured wage earners entitled to retirement benefits. All of these
1977]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
opportunity to prove dependency and thus establish their eligibility.
Finally, the Court concluded that the statutory presumptions of depen-
dency were reasonably related to the controlling factor-dependency
on the insured parent at the time of his death,56 and were, therefore,
constitutional.
provisions require children who are unable to meet the statutory presumptions of
dependency to prove that they were dependent on the insured parent at the onset of his
entitling event (retirement, disability, or death).
There is, however, a practical distinction in the provisions as they apply to children of
deceased insured, and to children of disabled or retired insureds. The Jimenez children
were born after the onset of their father's disability. They could not, therefore, possibly
have been living with or supported by their father at the onset of his disability and thus
could not possibly meet the proof requirement. A similar problem could apply to
afterborn children of retired insureds. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Weinberger, 388 F. Supp. 437
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Severance v. Weinberger, 362 F. Supp. 1348 (D.D.C. 1973). The
problem does not arise with survivor's benefits. There are no such afterborn children
simply because the insured worker cannot continue to produce children after the onset of
the entitling event--death. (Where the child has been conceived before the father's
death, but is born thereafter, and at the time of his death the father was living with or
supporting the child's mother, it has been held that the child was sufficiently "in being"
to meet the living with or supported by requirements and was entitled to benefits.
Wagner v. Finch, 413 F.2d 267, 268 (5th Cir. 1969).).
The Supreme Court in Jimenez relied heavily on the fact that afterborn illegitimate
children are conclusively denied benefits, with no opportunity to prove their actual
dependency on the wage earner. The Secretary argued, however, that the Act was
intended only to replace actual support enjoyed prior to the onset of the disability (or
death or retirement), that no children born after the onset of the disability were intended
to receive benefits under the Act, and that such a distinction was necessary to prevent
spurious and collusive claims. 417 U.S. at 633-35.
The Court rejected the Secretary's view of the purpose of the Act and noted that
afterborn children who meet the statutory presumptions are eligible for benefits even
though they could not possibly have been dependent on the wage earner at the onset of
his disability. Therefore, the Court held that the purpose of the Act was not exclusively
to replace support previously received but lost because of the parent's disability. Id. at
634-37. The Court thus concluded that since "the potential for spurious claims is the
same as to both . . . to conclusively deny one subclass [of illegitimates] benefits
presumptively available to the other denies the former the equal protection of the laws."
Id. at 637.
56. In agreeing that dependency at the time of the insured parent's death is the
controlling factor, the Court in Lucas assumed the Secretary's position that the Act was
intended to replace only that support actually lost because of the parent's death.
However, parallel statutory schemes were at issue in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S.
628 (1974), and the Court there appeared to reject this view of the purpose of the Act.
See note 55 supra.
In reliance on Jimenez, two lower federal courts had held the provisions at issue in
Lucas unconstitutional. These courts interpreted Jimenez as finding that the purpose of
the Act was not merely to replace support lost because of the parent's death, but rather
to provide benefits to all children of deceased insured wage earners. Further, these
courts noted that Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), held that if an enforceable right
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The readiness with which the Court found certain of these presump-
tions reasonable is troubling. For example, the Court was able to
conclude that state intestacy law is reasonably related to the likelihood
that at the time of his death, a parent was supporting his illegitimate
child. 57 Several of the other presumptions seem scarcely less tenu-
ous, 58 and there is some limited statistical evidence to suggest that they
in fact bear little relationship to the likelihood of dependency. 59 It is
of support is created for the legitimate child, it must also apply to the illegitimate child.
See note 39 supra. Thus, the courts reasoned that the provisions requiring only certain
illegitimate children to prove actual dependency were unconstitutional because they
operated to treat differently children who were similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the Act. Tanner v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1975); Lucas v.
Secretary, Dep't of H.E.W., 390 F. Supp. 1310 (D.R.I. 1975).
Another lower federal court, however, found Jimenez distinguishable and reached the
same decision as the Supreme Court in Lucas. In Norton v. Weinberger, 390 F. Supp.
1084 (D. Md. 1975), the court found the statements in Jimenez concerning the Act's
purpose narrowly limited to the case of conclusively excluded afterborn children, and
thus inapplicable where the insured worker is deceased. See note 55 supra.
The Court in Lucas did not take any definite stand on the purpose of the Act, saying
only that appellees failed to sustain the burden of showing the Secretary's interpretation
to be wrong. 427 U.S. at 508 n. 14. The Court did not appear to recognize any discrepancy
in its interpretation of the statutory provisions in Jimenez and in Lucas.
57. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 514-15 (1976). "[S]uch legislation [state intesta-
cy laws] also reflects to some degree the popular conception within the jurisdiction of the
felt parental obligation to such an 'illegitimate' child in other circumstances, and thus
something of the likelihood of actual parental support during, as well as after, life." Id.
at 515.
The Secretary and the Court did not agree as to whether this provision, 42 U.S.C. §
416(h)(2)(A) (1970), is accompanied by a presumption of dependency. See note 9 supra.
The court in Norton v. Weinberger, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Md. 1975), upheld the
classification scheme as rationally based, but nevertheless felt compelled to disagree
with the Court's dicta in Jimenez regarding this provision, stating: "This is significant to
the ultimate result in Norton because, if an individual were deemed dependent due to the
unrelated circumstance that he is favorably treated under his state's intestacy laws, a
significant question would be raised about the rational basis for the statutory scheme."
Id. at 1090 n.7.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2)(B) and 416(h)(3) (1970). See notes 10 and 11 supra for text
of provisions.
59. In Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 901
(1974), which involved the same statutory challenge as Jimenez (see note 55 supra), the
court noted:
In support of his argument the Secretary has introduced statistics from a study of
absent father families by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare which
demonstrate that where the father was or had been married to the mother 18.3% of
the families received contributions from the father whereas in families where the
father had never been married to the mother only 10.2% received such contribu-
tions. It can, with equal accuracy, be said that of the former group fully 82% of
such families did not receive support contributions from the father, yet the children
would nonetheless be eligible for insurance benefits under [42 U.S.C.] § 402(d). It
also appears, by reversing the figures in this manner, that only a slightly greater
percentage of families in the latter group did not receive contributions from the
father, there being a difference of just slightly more than 8%.
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obvious that under the statutory presumptions, many children must be
eligible for benefits without in fact being any more dependent than the
Lucas children. Indeed, even if it is undisputed that they are not in fact
dependent, the children nevertheless qualify. 60 Where paternity is not
at issue, these unsupported legitimate and illegitimate children stand in
the same position with respect to the purpose of the Act,6' yet are
treated differently. 62 Solely because of their illegitimacy, certain chil-
dren bear a burden of proof, not imposed on others, which effectively
excludes them from benefits other unsupported children receive by
presumption.
Any classification necessarily implies less than absolute precision.
The critical issue is how closely the assumption must conform to
reality in order to be "reasonable." The Court in Lucas stated that the
justification for such classifications need not be "scientifically sub-
stantiated ' 6 and that the burden is upon the challenger to demonstrate
the insubstantiality of the assumption created by the classification.64
478 F.2d at 306 n.9.
Appellant's brief in Norton v. Mathews, a companion case to Lucas, cites a Baltimore
study indicating that "[i]n 1971 . . .less than 25 per cent of the parents. . . who were
under a court support order in Baltimore City were actually making support payments."
Brief for Appellant at 52, Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976), citing, City Seeking
Aid to Enforce Support Payment Collection, The Sun (Baltimore), Jan. 11, 1971, at col.
5.
In Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479, 528 (1974), the
authors effectively argue that such data
compels the conclusion that a much more accurate categorization would be to grant
the presumption to all children whose fathers are living with them and to require all
children of absent fathers to establish dependence. Such a presumption would
preserve the requirement of dependency, but would be consistent with Congress'
evident desire not to bear the cost of requiring all children to prove dependence.
Significantly, it would also eliminate any hint of discriminatory treatment toward
illegitimate children.
Such a scheme would come considerably closer than the scheme upheld in Lucas to
meeting the Court's articulated standard--"carefully tuned to alternative considera-
tions." Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976). However, the Court in Lucas
declined to speculate about potentially "better" alternative classifications. Id. at 515.
60. 427 U.S. at 521 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. This assumes, as the Court did, that the purpose of the Act is only to replace
support actually lost by the parent's death. See note 56 supra.
62. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971). (In the context of a sex discriminatory
provision, the Court said: "Regardless of their sex, persons within any one of the
enumerated classes of that section are similarly situated with respect to [the] objective.
By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated,
the challenged section violates the equal protection clause.").
63. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
64. Id. Query how much and what kind of evidence would be necessary to sustain the
burden. The statistics cited, see note 59 supra, as well as others, were available to the
Court in deciding Lucas, since Norton was a companion case.
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The result in Lucas suggests that if any conceivable relationship ex-
ists, the classification is permissible. Only if the presumptions are
"unfounded, or so indiscriminate as to render the statutory classifica-
tion baseless, '65 will the scheme be invalidated. This language, and the
readiness with which the Court was willing to speculate as to the
reasonableness of the statutory presumptions, seem indistinguishable
from the deference accorded legislative classifications under the ra-
tional relation test.66 Under any stricter standard, it would, as the
dissent suggested, seem difficult to sustain such tenuous relationships
justified by no "weightier government interest than merely 'adminis-
trative convenience.' "67
How can the Court's apparent shift from a middle or higher standard
of review in prior illegitimacy cases to the deferential review in Lucas
be explained? The critical distinction the Court perceived between
Lucas and prior cases invalidating illegitimacy discriminations is that
in the provisions at issue in Lucas, status of birth is not itself the basis
of eligibility or ineligibility. Rather, the statute is "carefully tuned to
alternative considerations. "68 Illegitimacy is considered merely as indi-
cating the likelihood of the supposedly determining factor-dependen-
cy. In addition, if the illegitimate fails to qualify under the statutory
presumptions, he nevertheless has the opportunity to establish eligibili-
ty by proving actual dependency. 69
Early in the opinion the Court cited with approval the Weber test,70
which requires balancing the conflicting governmental and individual
interests involved. Applying this approach, the Court seems to hold
that when the denial is not per se based on illegitimacy, and when the
65. 427 U.S. at 516.
66. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420,426 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,611 (1960); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See note 40 supra.
67. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 519 (1976) (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
Administrative convenience has not generally been found to be a particularly strong
government interest, particularly when "stricter scrutiny" has been applied. See, e.g.,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656
(1972). Occasionally administrative convenience arguments have been disregarded even
when the rationality test was employed. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
68. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976).
69. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) where the plurality opinion held
that a similar scheme which used sex as the indicator of dependency and was justified
only by administrative convenience, could not withstand strict judicial scrutiny.
70. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 504. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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illegitimate has an opportunity to overcome the disability by a show of
proof, the infringement of the individual's interest is not sufficiently
onerous to outweigh a legitimate government interest.
Perhaps, then, Lucas and the prior illegitimacy decisions can best be
explained in terms of a sliding scale of standards. 71 When the burden
on the individual interest is perceived by the Court as relatively slight,
the means and ends of the governmental scheme will be less critically
scrutinized. This type of test is inherently subjective and is likely to
lead to continued confusion as lower courts attempt to resolve equal
protection challenges to particular illegitimacy classifications.
Ruth Hays De Bartolo
71. See Note, Illegitimacy & Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479, 491 (1974).
See also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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